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In Sweden, the potential deregulation of the land market has been discussed in recent years,
motivated by the increasing demand for external capital in agriculture. Corporate entities’ are
currently restricted from purchasing farmland by the Swedish Land Acquisition Act. In this thesis,
I have wanted to look at a case of this type of landowner, to investigate what consequences its land
ownership has on agrarian structures. This study is as such centered around the case of the Uppsala
University Endowment Management (UUEM), an institution which owns around 15.000 hectares
of farmland in mid-Sweden as part of its larger financial portfolio. The institution manages this
agricultural land with the explicit aim of achieving the highest possible returns on investment.
The results of this qualitative study, which is based on semi-structured interviews with twelve
informants, indicate that the economic benefits of keeping land for this type of long-term,
production-oriented land investor derives from the extraction of land rents, and the capital gains
made when land or real estate is decoupled from agricultural production as a consequence of
urbanization or the consolidation of farmland. While the profits made from owning agricultural
land are relatively modest, owning farmland as an asset is still attractive for the UUEM as it is a
way to lower the institution’s total portfolio risk, seeing as the relatively high risks associated with
agricultural production are externalized to the farmers leasing its land.
Even as the land is leased out, the UUEM was found to be exerting management control over
farms, notably through the top-down consolidation of land and (re)configuration of units, the
layout and infrastructure of which comes to be designed in a way which favors capital-intensive,
large-scale production. The institutional landowner can as such be said to steer agricultural
production into a certain matrix, and limit the farm development paths which can reasonably be
pursued by farmers on its land.
Many interviewed lessees viewed the corporate entity’s land ownership in a positive light,
seeing it to be providing tenants with the possibility of keeping up with the increased capital
requirements of agriculture in a region where farming is increasingly intensive and large-scale.
Rapid land appreciation, land concentration, and the subsequent growing separation between
labour and ownership over the means of production was not politicized by these informants, who
seemed to view this as more or less a natural process. By contrast, a few lessees questioned the
increasing concentration of land, in some cases expressing a preference for a land use and
ownership pattern characterized by less large-scale, autonomous family farms.
As the capital intensity of agricultural production increase, agrarian structures are impacted,
with the family farms in the investigated case seemingly having ceded some power over farm
development and reproduction to the landowner. At the same time, farmers maintained
considerable freedom when choosing what to produce and how, and there were indications that the
increasing financialization of land also opened up new possible avenues of action for large-scale
agricultural producers.
The proposal to deregulate corporate entities’ land ownership in Sweden has been motivated by
the advantages of scale in agriculture. This type of agrarian development however also contributes
to a loss of livelihoods and an increased concentration of land, among other things, which is a
reason why this deregulation and its effect on land use and ownership patterns deserves to be
debated.
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The financialization of agricultural land has increased in recent years, prompting
researchers to talk of a post-2008 land investment boom, or ‘land rush’ (see e.g.
Fairbairn, 2014a, 2014b). The great majority of case studies investigating this
development has looked at examples of ‘land grabbing’ in different contexts of
the Global South. However, previous literature indicates that large-scale land
investments that reconfigure local patterns of land use and ownership is a global-
wide phenomenon (see van der Ploeg, Franco & Borras, 2015; Kuns, Visser &
Wästfelt, 2016).
In regions of the Global North where agriculture is highly commercial, the long-
term consequences of the financialization of land, and the growing influence of
external actors in agriculture more generally, have been scarcely discussed. As
financial logics become more dominant in policy framings (see Clapp & Isakson,
2018), external capital provision can come to be portrayed as the obvious solution
to the problem of low agricultural profitability, which critics have pointed out can
lead to a depoliticization of land issues (e.g. Slätmo, 2018).
In Sweden, the perceived need to attract external capital to the agricultural sector
has resulted in the suggestion to deregulate corporate entities’ ownership of
farmland (see e.g. Sweden’s National Food Strategy, Prop. 2016/17:104). This
deregulation of the land market, which would open it up for land investments and
increased financialization of land, has been a central starting point for this thesis,
which will explore the consequence of this type of land ownership, with a special
focus on the effects it has on family farming, as the most prevailing type of
agriculture both globally and in Northern Europe (see Bosc et al. 2015). The
inquiry will be centered around the case of a corporate entity and financial
institution, namely the Uppsala University Endowment Management (Uppsala
Akademiförvaltning), which owns around 15.000 hectares of farmland in Sweden,
which it leases out to private family farmers.1
1 ‘Corporate entity’ is here used to refer to ‘a bank, corporation, partnership, limited liability company,
association, joint venture or other organization, whether an incorporated or unincorporated organization’, i.e.
to ‘any type of organization or legal entity other than an individual’ (Law Insider, n.d.). Technically, the




There is a lack of concrete case studies focused on the local consequences of the
financialization of land in the Global North. Exploratory research investigating
the micro-level expressions of such overarching and often abstract processes are
vital to be able to assess the scope of such trends, and their degree of uniformity
across contexts (Ouma, 2014; 2016; Ouma, Johnson & Bigger, 2018).
The case at hand is especially interesting as the investigated landowner and
investor seemingly diverges from the conceptualizations dominating the academic
literature. As we will see, the Uppsala University Endowment Management is not
an ‘absentee’ landowner and its relationship with leasing farmers contrasts the
growing geographical and interpersonal distance between actors which
characterizes the global food system in general (cf. Clapp, 2015). As an ‘atypical’
land investor and landowner operating in a context where few studies about the
financialization of land have been situated, the case of the UUEM can as such
potentially throw light on new or understudied aspects of the financialization of
land, the relationship between the family farm and external capital providers, and
what impact this can have on local land use and ownership patterns.
10
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the effects of the financialization of land on
agrarian structures in a context in the Global North. More specifically, I will be
looking at how the Uppsala University Endowment Management (UUEM)
manages farmland to extract financial capital, and what impact this type of land
ownership has on the family farm.
The aim has been operationalized into the following research questions:
1. What economic model and related land management strategy does the Uppsala
University Endowment Management (UEEM) have and/or pursue?
2. How does the UUEM and its land management impact the agricultural
production carried out on its land?
3. How do the farmers leasing land belonging to the UUEM view the landowner
and interrelated agrarian developments?
2. Research Question and Aim
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This chapter aims to explain and contextualize the increasing influence of
financial actors in agriculture, with a focus on land ownership and investment,
and how this impacts the family farm, as the globally dominant unit of
agricultural production.
This chapter will therefore begin with a characterization of the family farm and its
relation to the broader capitalist economy. This characterization will be drawing
on both Chayanov and the so-called Mann-Dickinson hypothesis, as I have chosen
to synthesize these two strands of thinking which I consider to have
complementary rather than competing explanatory value. In the second subsection,
I will describe and explain the increasing demand for capital in agriculture,
primarily relying on the concepts of cost-price squeeze, scale expansion and
production treadmill. In the last subsection, I will present an overview of previous
literature on the subject of land investment and the increasing financialization of
land.
3.1. Family Farming
Family-based agricultural production is the most common agrarian organizational
form globally, regardless if one has an historical or strictly contemporary outlook
(see Bosc et al. 2015). It is also the basis of the agrarian structure in Sweden,
where this study will be situated, which is why it has been integrated as a central
concept and starting point for this thesis.
As the name suggests, family farming is characterized by a close linkage between
agricultural production and kinship-based household unit (Bosc et al. 2015). As
such, it can be said to be defined by the fact that some factors of production (e.g.
land and/or labour) to some extent are reproduced autonomously on the farm, with
the emphasis in academic definitions often being placed on the family farms’
reliance on family labour (see e.g. Djurfeldt, 1996). As both a consumption and
production unit, the family farm is as such primarily defined by its capacity to
3. Theory
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manage costs in a flexible way, i.e. spending can be lowered and resources
worked more intensively if need be (Chayanov, 1986).
Family farming was predicted by Marxist thinkers to become more widely
replaced by ‘corporate agriculture’ based on wage labour as commodity relations
deepened. That family farming remains dominant in virtually all regions of the
world at the beginning of the 21st century has been interpreted to reflect various
characteristics which differentiates the agricultural sector from other parts of the
economy (Singer, Green & Gilles, 2008). One such characteristic is the relatively
long turn-over time of capital in agriculture, which can partly by seen as a
consequence of the fact that crops need to be left to natural processes during
particular periods of time. The natural cycles of crops in turn impacts the demand
for labour in agriculture, which tends to fluctuate heavily between seasons, while
at the same time being quite rigid, as there are clear time frames posed by nature
in which field operations, such as harvesting and fertilizing, need to be carried out
in order to be successful (see Lighthall & Roberts, 1995). In this context, the
flexible command over resources, not least labour, is what makes family farming
a competitive organizational form even under mature capitalist conditions. In fact,
van der Ploeg (2008:49) argues that most farmers in Western Europe today would
be forced to close down operations if they had to start paying full market prices
for all inputs, as a majority of farms depend on cheap access to key resource, and
the ability to exploit (or under-invest in) these on-farm resources when required,
in order to remain viable.
While a large share of family farmers engage in self-exploitation by working
‘flexible’ hours and systematically remunerating their own labour at below market
prices, the family farm simultaneously functions as a vehicle for the capital
accumulation of external actors. Surpluses are extracted from the family farm by
banks, landowners, and input companies, among others, which farmers are bound
to through relations of debt, tenancy, contract-farming, and so on. Another part of
the sectoral identity of agriculture is the high risks associated with agricultural
production, to a large extent steaming from the long turnover times mentioned
above, which these actors evade by externalizing them on the farming households
(see Goodman & Radcliff, 1985; Singer, Green & Gilles, 2008). While this
dynamic has long historical roots, there are reasons to believe that the surplus
extraction from agriculture has intensified in the Global North in recent decades,
as agricultural production has become more large-scale and capital-intensive (see
e.g. Larder, Sippel, & Argent, 2018; van der Ploeg, 2010).
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3.2. Cost-Price Squeeze Adaptation and Farm Scale
The growing scale and capital intensity of agricultural production is related to the
so-called ‘cost-price squeeze’. During recent decades, the profit margins of
agricultural production has continuously shrunk. This is due to technological
advancements and subsequent overproduction, which has caused commodity
prices to fall.2 In other words, farmer have come to be paid less per unit over time.
Simultaneously, they have also faced a gradual increase of the cost of production
during the last decades, largely as a result of the increased use and relative cost of
external inputs (see e.g. Clapp, 2015, 2016). Together, these trends have caught
agricultural producers around the globe in an economic ‘squeeze’, to which they
have had to respond, often by adapting their operations using a number of
different ‘strategies’ in mix-and-match combinations (see e.g. Andrade, 2016;
Glover & Reay, 2015; Johnsen, 2004).
One such strategy is increased off-farm labour. Scandinavian research shows that
many farmers have turned to off-farm employment, with the average share of total
income derived from on-farm activities having decreased over time. In many
cases, this has meant that one partner’s full-time off-farm employment has
become central to support the household, and that increasing number of farms are
being managed purely as a part-time activity (Andrade, 2016; Djurfeldt &
Waldenström, 1999). There are however also several ways to ‘adapt’ to the cost-
price squeeze while maintaining autonomous on-farm reproduction. Producers can
for example choose to niche production towards more high-value crops, perform
more on-farm value-adding activities, and/or diversify farm incomes by e.g. using
farm machinery to perform contract work (ibid.).
A much pursued farm development path has been to expand farm operations.
Farm expansion can be measured either by scale or size, with there being a subtle
but important difference between the two. Farm size, as measured in hectares,
correlates with different labour/capital ratios and investment patterns, which in
turn impacts factor productivity to produce different ‘farm scales’. The size of a
farm can as such grow independently of the scale, if more land is added but input
ratios remain the same, just as farmers can increase farm scale independently of
farm size, if e.g. mechanization leads to a partial substitution of labour for capital
input (Woodhouse, 2010). There is however a strong correlation between size and
scale, as the introduction of new types of labour-saving ‘high-tech’ equipment
increase the scale of farms, which in turn allows farmers to work more land using
2 Neoliberal market deregulation and increased international competition, as well as the increasing
market concentration in the food sector, which puts primary producers in a more disadvantaged
position in relation to buyers, are also often mentioned as factors which have contributed to the fall
in prices of agricultural commodities (Clapp, 2015; 2016).
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the same amount of labour. Often mechanization does not only make it possible to
expand size-wise, but also put economic pressure on producers to do so, since
machinery comes with a minimum use threshold, below which the gains made
from labour productivity increases do not supersede initial investment costs (see
Fitzgerald, 2003).
Large-scale industrial agricultural production is in other words by definition
capital demanding. With mechanization and the increased use of industrial inputs,
financial capital partially comes to replace labour and natural capital3 in the
production process. There are good reasons why this is considered to be a positive
development for and by family farmers, seeing as the ‘modernization’ of
agricultural production reduces the amount of ‘drudgery’ in the form of hard (and
often badly remunerate) labour. The gradual industrialization of production also
have other far-reaching effects on agricultural production however, as the whole
system of interrelated practices, relationships and technologies in which
agricultural production is embedded often need to be adjusted and adapted in
response to changes in farm size and labour/capital ratio (see Fitzgerald, 2003).
Farmers are for example more likely to cultivate more leased land, visit individual
plots less often, have more geographical and emotional distance to the crop, and
use larger, more soil-compacting machinery as farms are expanded (Lighthall &
Roberts, 1995). Scale expansion has also notably been identified as a hindrance
for inter-generational continuation in agriculture, both because it is seen to reduce
early childhood socialization, and because it is more difficult to divide
inheritances between siblings without selling the farm when the amount of capital
fixed in machinery, stables, land, etc. increase in relation to income (see Fischer
& Burton, 2014). This is one reason as to why the increasing capital-intensity of
agriculture has been said to induce a growing separation between land, capital and
labour (Couchet, 2008; Marzin, Daviron & Rafflegeau, 2015).
By extension, the increased capital intensity of agriculture of course also reduces
the farming household’s reliance on an autonomous resource base (van der Ploeg,
2010). In other words, the fixed and inflexible production costs in the form of e.g.
debt repayments, land rents, input purchases, etc. tend to increase as the scale of
agricultural production expand, which leads to family farms being further
‘enmeshed’ in capital relationships (Larder, Sippel, & Argent, 2018:399).
According to van der Ploeg (2020), external actors come to exert more influence
3 One prominent example of natural capital in this context is soil health. Financial capital is used to
purchase artificial fertilizer, which replaces not only manure, but also ‘soil services’ in the
production process, as a number of ecosystem services contributing to soil fertility tend to
disappear or decrease over time as a consequence of intensive agricultural production (Brady et al.
2012).
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over agriculture as a result. The gradual adaptation of family-based agricultural
production to external demands and protocols in this context, he argues, can go as
a far as to constitute a form of ‘external management’, signaling a potential
decline in farm autonomy (van der Ploeg, 2020).
With the increasing scale and capital intensity of agricultural production, the
family farm can in other words be said to become more commercial. The family
farm has in this context been theorized to at some point become a ‘family firm’,
operated according to the same logics as any other capitalistic enterprise (see
Marzin, Daviron, Rafflegeau, 2015; van der Ploeg, 2008; Zhang & Donaldson,
2010). This is not least relevant for this thesis, as a central assumption made is
that ‘family farming’, continues to be a meaningful concept even in the chosen
context of a region in the Global North, where large-scale industrial agriculture is
practiced. While some studies points to a high degree of continuity in agricultural
producers’ decision-making strategies and self-images (see e.g. Niska et al. 2012),
others indicate that the subjectivities of farmers who are pursuing a scale
expansion farm development path in Northern Europe are changing relatively
rapidly, with traditional farming identities being gradually abandoned in favour of
more individualistic and ‘entrepreneurial’ conceptions of self (see e.g. Silvasti,
2009). I will have reason to return to this in the discussion.
Lastly it should be noted that farm expansion has long been propagated in the
name of efficiency in many regions, not least in the Global North. The narrative in
which large-scale farming is equalized with rationality has however increasingly
been called into question in the last decade. While studies on optimal labour-
capital and land-labour ratios have yielded ambiguous results (see Latruffe, 2010
for a summary of these debates), there is considerable support for the hypothesis
that expanding the scale of production often increases labour productivity at the
expense of productivity per hectare, as well as energy efficiency (Woodhouse,
2010). According to its critics, large-scale agriculture is as such a production
matrix which has become dominant not so much due to its capacity to out-
compete other forms of agriculture, but because it has been politically and
discursively favoured, for example in the current design of EU’s Common
Agricultural Policy (Gowdy & Beveye, 2019; van der Ploeg, 2010).
Seeing as scale expansion as a sector wide agrarian development leads to
increased land concentration and decreased agricultural employment, it has also
been criticized for its social impacts (Woodhouse, 2010). While contributing to
land inequality and loss of rural livelihoods, the expansion of the scale of
agricultural production also upholds and reinforces the structural problem of
agricultural overproduction, and hence low commodity prices. This type of
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agrarian development as such risks to ‘lock’ some farmers into a debt-fueled cycle
of further expansions and technology-driven intensification, while forcing other to
exit the sector. This dynamic has been referred to as the ‘production treadmill’
(van der Ploeg, 2010, see also Cochrane, 1979).
3.3. The Financialization of Land
As a consequence of the increasing capital intensity of agricultural production, the
role of financial actors, markets and motives in the sector has become more
pronounced, a process referred to as ‘financialization’ (Clapp & Isakson, 2018).
This thesis is especially concerned with the financialization of land, defined as the
conversion of agricultural land into an asset used to create and extract financial
capital (see Wu, 2019). According to previous research, land investments are
often warmly greeted by farmers and rural communities in contexts in the Global
North where intensive agriculture is practiced, as local farmers following a scale
expansion farm development strategy tend to view the inflow of external capital
as an opportunity to ‘keep up’ with the capital investments required to derive the
same level of income from the farm (see Sippel, Larder & Lawrence, 2017; Ouma,
2016). With increased financialization, external capital provision has increasingly
come to be portrayed as the solution to the problem of low profitability in
agriculture more generally in public discourse (see Slätmo, 2018 on the case of
Sweden). As large-scale industrial agriculture in many agrarian and development
discourses is equated with economic efficiency, questions about the role and form
of external capital provision in agriculture, and its impact on land use and
ownership patterns, can potentially come to be depoliticized, i.e. framed to appear
as not being a point of contention or political conflict (see Li, 2011; see also
Feindt, Scwindenhammer & Tosun, 2020).
While the demand for capital has increased in agriculture in recent years, so too
have financial investors’ interest in land. As mentioned in the introduction, land
investments increased dramatically after the 2008 financial crisis, as a
consequence of market volatility and declining returns on investment in many
other sectors. With global population growth, income-related diets shifts, and an
increased interest in bio-based energy sources, the total demand for farmland is
expected to continue to increase during the coming decades, making land even
more desirable as an investment asset (Bonnano, 2016; Visser, Clapp & Isakson,
2015).
At the same time, there are also hurdles to overcome when land is to be
‘assembled’ and made into an asset (see Li, 2014) which may hold back the trend
of the financialization of land. The specific embedded nature of land as a resource
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e.g. makes the creation of standardized investment instruments difficult, which
means that land investments tend to be smaller than investments in other asset
classes (Ouma, 2014; 2016). As farmland is a resource of key importance for
human survival, and food production often is considered to be of special national
interest, land investments are also in general more regulated than other types of
investments. The role of national legislation in setting the conditions under which
financialization occurs has in this context been given special emphasis in previous
literature (e.g. Sippel, Larder & Lawrence, 2017).
The attraction of land however remains considerable. One of the advantages of
land from an investor perspective is that it, unlike many other types of financial
assets, is also a means of production. As such, land is ‘like gold with yield’,
providing investor with incomes both in the form of capital gains and in the form
of production surpluses (Fairbairn, 2014a; Kuns, Visser & Wästfelt, 2016).
Previous research indicates that investors as a general rule however expect a
majority of the profits from land investments to derive from asset appreciation
rather than agricultural production (ibid.). The attraction of farmland for financial
investors also often at least partly lies in the diversity it adds to their financial
portfolio (Ouma, 2016), with farmland not least being valued for being a good
‘inflation hedge’ (Fairbairn, 2014a).
There are reasons to believe that the financialization of land can have far-reaching
consequence on both material practices and social relations (see e.g. van der Ploeg,
Franco & Borras, 2015), with researchers expressing concern that the
financialization of land - as a process through which share-holder interests
directly and indirectly come to yield more influence over rural landscapes and
agricultural production - may contribute to a number of undesirable developments,
such as land inequality, loss of employment and livelihoods, and a shift towards
more large-scale monocultures and more environmentally degrading agricultural
practices (see Tomaso, 2017).
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This chapter is meant to provide the reader with an overview of the economic
structure of the Swedish agricultural sector, as well as the most relevant parts of
the legal framework which surrounds land ownership and tenure in the country.
4.1. Characteristics and Trends
As in other places in the world, Swedish farmers have been forced to adapt to
shrinking profit margins during the last decades (see e.g. Hajdu et al. 2020;
Wästfelt & Eriksson, 2017). Van der Ploeg’s (2008) claim that the use of inputs,
such as labour and land, acquired or utilized at below market rates is central in
retaining profitability for European farmers is supported by the fact that only 60
percent of Swedish farms had a production value that superseded production costs
between 2005 and 2013 (OECD, 2018), with only approximately 17 percent being
able to afford to pay for land, labour and other inputs at full market-prices (ibid.).
Many farmers have chosen to adapt ‘with their feet’ and exit the sector during
recent decades, as indicated by a continuous decrease in the number of farms:
between the year 2000 and 2016, an average of 1.9 percent of Swedish farms shut
down every year (OECD, 2018) Meanwhile the size of the average farm in
Sweden increased from 30 hectares to 40 ha between 1990 and 2015 (Karlsson,
2017). Larger farms have increased the most in both size and numbers during this
time period. In 2020, large-scale farms, defined as farms cultivating more than
one hundred hectares, worked sixty percent of Swedish farmland (Jordbruksverket,
2020), up from just 24 percent in 1990 (Edenbrandt, 2012). At the same time
larger farms have tended to close down at a higher rate than small- and middle-
size farms (Karlsson, 2017), which can be explained by the degree of
indebtedness of these farms, which increases risk and makes farm contraction
nonviable (Lantbrukarnas Riksförbund, 2015; see also Roberts, 1996 ).
Land prices in Sweden have soared during recent years, with the cost of farmland
increasing by 200 percent on a national level between 1999 and 2011, with large
inter- and intraregional differences (Svensson, 2014). These price increases are
4. Swedish Agriculture
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thought to be too dramatic to be caused by increased agricultural productivity
alone, and are often said to mirror the growing importance of land as a financial
asset (OECD, 2018), as well as a range of other factors, including low interest
rates, real and expected competition for land as a result of urban expansion, and
the 2005 reform of the EU Common Agricultural Policy (Svensson, 2014). Land
rents have also increased rapidly, although at a less extreme pace: between the
year 2000 and 2012, they doubled in the south of Sweden, while only increasing
between twenty to thirty percent in the rest of the country (ibid.).
The geographical locus of this thesis is the region of Uppland in East Middle
Sweden, a district containing both more forest-covered areas and large fertile
plains. These landscape conditions seem to be the basis of different development
trajectories, as production costs on more marginal land tend to be minimized by
extensification rather than intensification, with cropland being converted to
pasture. In the plains surrounding Uppsala by contrast, specialized grain
production is the type of farm specialization which has increased the most
(Wästfelt & Eriksson, 2017). This is the type of crop production which has the
lowest labour requirements per hectare, making it especially well-adapted for
large-scale production (ibid.) Due to the dominance of industrial agricultural
production in this area, the Uppland region as a whole has the largest average
farm size in Sweden, as well as some of the highest land prices (Edenbrandt,
2012).
4.2. The Land Acquisition Act
The ‘scale rationalization’4 of Swedish agriculture can be said to have been an
ongoing process and political project during the whole post-war period. Between
1945 to 1991, the structural transformation of the agricultural sector was
orchestrated largely from above, with the state interfering directly in the land
market in order to ’modernize’ it by creating units of scale. This was done through
regional Agricultural Committees (lantbruksnämnd) which e.g. reserved
preemptive rights, issued buying licensees and state credits, etc. (Flygare &
Isacson, 2003).
Currently, the Swedish land market remains regulated by the Land Acquisition
Act, which stipulates that corporate entities (legal persons) can not buy farmland
from private individuals (natural persons) without selling the same amount of land
to other private individuals, unless a special permission from authorities has been
4 In this thesis, I will use ‘scale rationalization’, as an English translation of a Swedish term, in
order to refer to the process in which both farm size and scale is increased in tandem (see
Woodhouse, 2010).
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obtained. The purpose of this law is to maintain the ratio of land owned by these
different categories of owners, In practice, it means that almost no new corporate
entities can enter the Swedish land market (Pettersson, 2020). As already
mentioned, family farming dominates agricultural production in Sweden, with
around 92 percent of Swedish farmland currently being owned by private
individuals (Latruffe & Mouel, 2006). As in other European countries, there is a
strong correlation in Sweden between the size of units and the type of landowner.
In 2006, 83 percent of farms owned by corporate entities was larger than 100
hectares, compared to just 38 percent of those owned by private individuals (ibid.).
As mentioned in the introduction, the current Land Acquisition Act, which
hinders corporate entities from freely acquiring land, has come to be questioned in
Sweden in recent years. The suggestion to deregulate corporate entities’
ownership of farmland appeared in an official state inquiry in 2015 (SOU,
2015:15), and was later raised in the government’s National Food Strategy of
2017, where the current Land Acquisition Act is portrayed as a problem, given the
perceived need to attract external capital to revitalize to the agricultural sector:
“Rationalizations in the agricultural sector will require large capital
investments. There will be a call for increased dynamism, new owners and
new types of owners to take over and invest in companies. The
Competitiveness Investigation [SOU, 2015:15] made the assessment that
the Land Acquisition Act in its present design is having a limiting effect on
the competitiveness of Swedish agriculture by hindering external capital
provision” (Prop. 2016/17:104, p. 30, my translation).
Opening up the Swedish land market to institutional and corporate landowners is
here identified as one way to secure the external capital needed to ‘rationalize’ the
agricultural sector by further expanding the scale of production.
Previous research indicate that Swedish farmers however do not necessarily see
changes in the land ownership structure as being an obvious or desirable way to
increase their access to capital (Slätmo, 2018). The Federation of Swedish
Farmers (Lantbrukarnas Riksförbund, LRF), the main farmers’ organization in
Sweden, has opposed the suggested policy change, stating that the positives with
the current Land Acquisition Act outweigh the negatives. More severe critic has
been presented by Sweden’s main small-holder organization (Nordbruk), which in




In addition to the Land Acquisition Act, the regulatory framework surrounding
agricultural tenure in Sweden will be central for this thesis.
The protective Swedish tenure legislation is relatively extensive, notably
guaranteeing security of tenure to all agricultural lessees with contracts spanning
over one year. In practice, this means that all such tenure contracts are
automatically renewed at the end of each contract period. Landowners are as such
unable to terminate tenancy relations during the lifetime of the tenant, once they
have signed the first three- or five-year contract. There are six exceptions to this
rule, with the landowner’s need to expand units being one of them. In order to
terminate a contract for ‘rationalization purposes’, the landowner has to ‘make
evident that the land is needed for a more efficient division of farm units and there
are no special grounds to consider it unreasonable/unfair (obilligt) for the tenant
that the lease is terminated’ (Jordabalk, 1970:994, 9:8§, my translation). In case
of conflict, questions of this nature would ultimately to be settled in one of
Sweden’s specialized Tenancy Tribunals (arrendenämnd) (Nelson, 2014).
According to Swedish law, land rents are meant to reflect the land’s yielding
capacity (avkastningsförmåga) , i.e. the income the farmer can be expected to
make from it (Bäärnheim, 2014). As of today, there are no concrete governmental
guidelines for how such calculations are to be made, only recommendations from
the Federation of Swedish Farmers (LRF). At the prolongation of lease contracts,
which normally happens every five years, the landowner can push for increased
land rents or other changes in the terms and conditions, which the tenant has to
agree to unless these are ‘unreasonable’ (oskäliga). If an agreement can not be
reached, such matters are also assessed and settled in a Tenancy Tribunal (ibid.).
4.4. The Uppsala University Management (UUEM)
The landowner at this case study is based upon is the Uppsala University
Endowment Management (Uppsala Akademiförvaltning), an institution managing
the capital of around 600 donation-based foundations connected to Uppsala
University. The managed capital is divided into four types of assets: farmland,
forest, urban real estate and financial stocks (Uppsala Akademiförvaltning, 2020).
In total, the UUEM owns around 15.000 hectares of farmland (ibid.), which
corresponds to roughly 0.5 percent of total active agriculture land in Sweden,
making it one of the biggest landowners in the country (Jordbruksverket, 2020,
my calculation).
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The UUEM’s land ownership precedes the current Land Acquisition Act, having
its origins in a donation of around 378 farms which were gifted to Uppsala
University by the Swedish king in 1624. The surplus extracted from these farms
were long enough to support the University, covering all its expenses up until the
early 19th century. As per the Swedish Land Acquisition Act, the UUEM is today
unable to purchase additional land from ‘physical’ landowners without selling the
same amount of land to other physical landowners. This means that the size of
UUEM’s land holdings are more or less constant. By strategically buying and
selling land, the UUEM has however consolidated its land ownership into larger
units and strengthened its position in some areas at the cost of losing land in
others (Uppsala Nya Tidning, 2013; Uppsala Akademiförvaltning, 2020). In 2017,
the institution had consolidated its land into 41 farm units, with an average size
of around 240 hectares (Uppsala Nya Tidning, 2017), i.e. around six times the
average Swedish farm size (Karlsson, 2017). In addition to this, the UUEM was
also leasing out around one hundred freestanding fields (sidoarrenden) (Uppsala
Nya Tidning, 2017).
The explicit aim of the UUEM as a financial institution is to ‘strive to achieve the
highest possible return from the foundation’s assets while preserving the long-
term capacity of the fixed capital’ (Uppsala University, n.d. my translation). In
short, the institution aims to grow the entrusted capital as much as possible, in the
interest of the different foundations’ beneficiaries, which often include university
students. The UUEM is governed by an ‘outer board’, which is identical to the
decision-making board of Uppsala University (konsistoriet). Operational
decisions on how to manage assets, including farmland, in a way which is
consistent with the above-mentioned aim is however in general taken by an ‘inner
board’, which includes member from the outer board, in addition to a number of
members external to the University (UUEM manager, private communication,
12/03/2021).
Despite these close links, the UUEM is structurally not a part of Uppsala
University and does not belong to the public sector. As such, the UUEM does not
have to adhere to laws and norms of public governance (UUEM manager, private
communication, 12/03/2021). As a limited partnership run by wage employees,
the UUEM can be said to differ from most landowners in Sweden, not least seeing
as the institution owns large swaths of land that it does not work, and has the
ability to mobilize capital internally (see Ashwood et al., 2020).
The UUEM is however also far from a ‘typical’ land investor, given its long-term
investment horizon, the geographical closeness which characterizes its land
investments, and the particularly low risk of its land investments (cf. Clapp &
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Isakson, 2018; Fairbairn, 2014b; Kuns, Visser & Wästfelt, 2016; Ouma, 2016).
The long-term investment horizon in this context consists in that the UUEM has
no apparent ‘exit’ strategy. Even as it buys and sells specific individual plots of
land, it has the explicit plan of owning the same amount of farmland in the given
land market ‘forever’ (UUEM manager, private communication, 12/03/2021, cf.
Fairbairn, 2014a). The geographical closeness refers to the fact that the land, the
institutional investor, and the recipients of the extracted capital could all be said to
be mainly located in and around the city of Uppsala. This makes the UUEM quite
special, as this regional embeddedness contrasts with how most land investors
operate on the global financial market. The personal relationships between actors
is also deviating in a global food system characterized by increasing geographical
and interpersonal ‘distance’ (Clapp, 2015). Finally, the UUEM’s investments in
land can be characterized as particularly low risk, since long-term farmland
investments in developed countries are the most ‘risk conservative’, and risks
furthermore are minimized when land is leased out rather than managed directly
(see Fairbairn, 2014b). As such, the UUEM is a a type of investor which
indirectly has been considered to be comparatively socially desirable (cf. Bonnano,
2016) but which has been scarcely studied.
The reason the UUEM can still be considered to be an example of the
financialization of land is that the institution owns agricultural land as a financial
asset and use it to create and extract financial capital (see Wu, 2019). With its
historical roots going back to the time when most Swedish farmland was owned
by the crown, the aristocracy or the church, and leased out to (peasant) family
farmers, the UUEM has, as we will see, changed with the times, and adapted its
land management strategy in response to developments in the agrarian sector and
society at large.
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In this section, I will describe the research process, and the decisions and ethical
considerations that have been taken throughout it. I will also outline the
limitations of the chosen methodology, as well as clarify my own position and
role in the research process.
5.1. Case Selection
As a university student of Uppsala and an inhabitant of rural Uppland, I was
intrigued by the case of the UUEM, as an example of the larger trend of the
financialization of land so ‘close to home’. From a research perspective, the
UUEM can however be seen as an ‘atypical’ case of financialization, for reasons
detailed in subsection 4.4.
Cases that diverge from the ones studied in previous literature, or which deviate
from the common understanding on a particular subject, can be particularly
worthy of study, given that they have the potential to throw light on new or
understudied aspects of the research topic (Seawright & Gerring, 2008).
5.2. Data Gathering
This thesis is based on semi-structured, qualitative interviews with a total of 12
participants.
Lessees: A total of eight lessees have been interviewed for this thesis. Four of
these informants are currently leasing farmland from the UUEM, and four are
previous lessees. A majority of these informants are also leasing (or have leased)
additional farmland from other landowners, and six out of the eight are also
landowners themselves. Six of the eight lessees interviewed are leasing (or have




Experts: This group consists of three persons selected based on their knowledge
of land issues in Sweden in general, and in one case also of UUEM’s land
management in particular. Between them, they have held various positions such as
lay judge in the regional Tenancy Tribunal (arrendenämnd), board member of the
Association for Swedish Agricultural Tenants (Sveriges Jordarrendatorsförening),
among others. Experts were mainly asked questions about institutional
landowners and tenure relations in Swedish agriculture more generally. The
decision to include this group of informants was motivated by a wish to get to
know the larger context better, and to get a third-party view of the management
strategies and impact of institutional landowners such as the UUEM in Sweden.
Two of the experts live and work in the region of Uppland, and one in
Västmanland, a neighbouring region in which the UUEM also owns a large
amount of land.
UUEM manager: The employee responsible for the land management of the
UUEM was interviewed on two separate occasions.
Interviewed tenants were selected largely according to what could be described as
a non-purposive, convenience sampling strategy (Bryman, 2012:201), with some
being selected randomly from the extensive list of names of UUEM lessees which
I encountered as a public record file, and others being contacted based on tips
from previous informants or my supervisor (snowballing sampling). The “expert”
informants and the UUEM manager were of course contacted based on their
positions in relevant organizations (purposive sampling). I choose to employ this
mixture of sampling strategies, since I considered it conducive given my aim,
which has not been to establish statistical representation, but to achieve analytical
richness.
Different interview guides were prepared for each set of participants, and
modified more or less between each interview. In general, I tried to keep the
interviews I conducted quite open-ended, and ask a lot of follow-up questions in
order to uncover participants’ personal understandings, opinions and
interpretations of the social world (see Bryman, 2012:470). The interviews, which
lasted between 30-70 minutes, were all recorded and manually transcribed.
Only two of the interviews were carried out in person, with the rest being
conducted over telephone or video call. This is of course not ideal, seeing as non-
verbal information and cues are then lost on the interviewer. Visiting relevant
environments and observing informants in them can also enrich the researcher’s
understanding of the questions at hand (see Novick, 2008). Interviewing
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informants face-to-face was however not seen to be ethically justifiable in most
cases given the Covid-19 pandemic.
All potential female informants contacted declined to participate. This means that
potential gendered aspects of the topic of hand is something that this thesis will
only be able reflect on indirectly, by the absence of female voices.5 As someone
who otherwise sympathizes with feminist research methodology, I consider the
uneven gender division to be a clear limitation of my material, and am aware that
my thesis falls into the trap of treating ‘the family’ as an unanimous whole,
unaffected by internal power inequalities or differences of interests (see e.g.
Agarwal, 1997; Alderman et al. 1995).
In addition to the interviews, I have chosen to include just one document as a part
of the empirical material, namely the standard tenure contract between the UUEM
and farm unit lessees (gårdsarrendatorer) for the 2014-2019 period. I obtained
three different lease contracts from a a Tenancy Tribunal after having requested
access to public record files related to the UUEM. These were compared against
each other and found to be identical on all relevant points. Given the way in
which I came by these documents, I have deemed them to be authentic. The lease
contract was included in the material given that it, as the legal document defining
the relation between the investigated institution and its tenants, was been judged
to be of special relevance given the aim of this thesis.
5.3. Data Analysis
When analyzing the material, I followed the inductive approach of grounded
theory (Breckenridge, 2014). The starting point of the coding process was the
identification of dominant and recurring themes. This initial phase in turn pointed
to the need for additional data collection, the result of which in turn impacted the
emerging categorization (see Bryman, 2012:571). As I labeled and conceptualized
my findings, I gradually moved from a more ‘open’ to a more ‘selective’ coding
(Breckenridge, 2014). While theoretical saturation is judged to have been
achieved for the questions at hand (see Bryman, 2012:421), additional interviews
could have been carried out as a number of different threads for further research
emerged during the process of data collection and analysis.
5 The absence of women throughout this study could notably also be said to reflect agrarian gender
relations. In 2016, 77 percent of Swedish agricultural companies were registered in a man’s name,
with women making up 85 percent of employed spouses (Jordbruksverket, 2019). The
husband/father would then in the majority of cases be the family member whose name is on the
agricultural lease and who is responsible for negotiating the tenant-landlord relationship.
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5.4. Ethics and Reflexivity
The interviews were based on the informed consent of all participants, who had
the right to retract statements in retrospect or to completely disassociate from the
study, would they so choose. Instead of actual names, pseudonyms have been
used to refer to some individual informants in the thesis. I have made an effort to
not include identifying details in the presentation of the empirical material, seeing
as some of the issues at hand can be considered somewhat sensitive. For the same
this reason, some particularly enlightening anecdotes have also been excluded.
When translating excerpts from the interviews into English, I have tried to keep
these as verbatim as possible. In order to keep quotes both legible and true to their
intended meaning, I have however sometimes had to deviate somewhat from this
principle. Even so, some nuances and connotations in the original text are
inevitably lost during the process of translation, while others are unintentionally
added. On a related note, far from all interviewed agricultural producers for this
thesis seemed to identify themselves primarily as ‘farmers’ (bönder). In order to
use accessible language, I have however decided to ignore this and use the terms
‘farmer’ and ‘producer’ interchangeably.6
Before starting this thesis, my view of the UUEM was shaped by a few instances
where the institution had been drawing (largely negative) public and media
attention. Throughout the process of writing this thesis, I have tried to be aware of
my preconceptions due to this exposure, and have continuously tried to sideline
preconceived notions to the largest extent possible, in order to open up for a
nuanced understandings of the topic at hand. For the sake of transparency, it
should also be mentioned that I, as a student living in Uppland, have received a
scholarship from a foundation the capital of which is managed by the UUEM.
During one of the interviews, it also emerged that the informant in question and
myself had mutual connections. I do not consider myself as having personal
loyalties in any direction as a consequence of these circumstances.
5.5. Scientific Paradigm
The worldview which underlies this thesis is critical realism, a framework which
famously combines ontological realism with epistemic relativism. The belief in
the existence of an objective reality - presumed to be layered, with underlying
structures and mechanisms shaping tangible local events - is in other words
coupled with a view of knowledge as being socially produced (see Roberts, 2014).
6 See Upplandsmuséet (2020) for a discussion on the changing occupational identities of Swedish
farmers and their emic perspective on this development.
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Seeing as I understand knowledge as being constructed from various standpoints,
one way of trying to create a nuanced portrayal of the case at hand has been to
interview several different ‘categories’ of informants. Even so, science is fallible,
and the presentation and interpretation of the studied case which will emerge in
the following chapters should not to be taken to be definitive or ‘objective’ (ibid.).
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The empirical part of this thesis is divided into three sections. The first one
focuses on the Uppsala University Endowment Management’s economic model.
The second section builds on the findings presented in the first and delves into the
land management strategy of the institution. The third section is centered on
lessees’ perspectives of the UUEM, the financialization of land and related
agrarian changes.
6.1. The Economic Model
In this section, a sketch of the UUEM’s economic model will be presented.
‘Economic model’ is here operationalized to refer to the different ways in which
the UUEM benefits economically from keeping land as an asset, as well as the
manners in which the institution is working to enhance these benefits to maximize
returns, which, after all, is the explicit aim of the institution’s land management
(see Uppsala University, n.d.).
6.1.1. Land in the Portfolio
The first dimension of the UUEM’s economic model is centered around how the
income generated from the farmland compliments the incomes derived from the
institution’s other assets.
“The land gives low but stable returns. And that is important, as we have
large fluctuations on the stock market, on the other extreme.” -
UUEM manager
Of the four types of assets the UUEM owns, farmland is the one that carries the
least amount of risk for the institution, as the comparatively high risks associated
with agricultural production is externalized to the producers, in line with the
theoretical framework for this thesis. For the UUEM, owning farmland is as such
a way to provide stability to, and lower the total risk of, its financial portfolio.
Seeing as the Land Acquisition Act hinders the UUEM from freely purchasing
additional farmland, it is difficult for the institution to enhance these benefits. The
interviewed UUEM land manager stated the institution would not necessarily be
6. Results
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interested in doing so in any case, since, according to him, the current asset
division has been assessed and found to be satisfactory.
6.1.2. Farmland as Invested Capital
Given the low profitability of agricultural production, a couple of informants
seemed to believe that the UUEM’s ownership of agricultural land would be
motivated mostly by the capital gains made from land appreciation. As the
interviewed UUEM manager pointed out, the Land Acquisition Act means that
the UUEM needs to maintain a balance between sales and purchases, and buy as
much land as it sells, if it is not to permanently shrink the size of its landholding.
The gains from the of appreciation of the fixed asset as such remains largely
‘locked up’ in the land. The institution do however benefit directly from land
appreciation under some circumstance. One example of this is related to
urbanization, and the dramatic appreciation which as a rule precedes the moment
when agricultural land is claimed by local plans for urban expansion. As the
UUEM owns a considerable part of its cropland in what could be described as
urban and peri-urban areas, some informants claimed that the institution has
benefited from the ‘disproportional’ land appreciation in these areas.
“If you look at the UUEM, they have made good deals from being able to
(...) subdivide properties so close to the city. (...) They have old land
holdings in the direction of Sunnersta7 and there they have gotten millions
for each lot.” - Roland
In some cases, the UUEM also seems to have chosen to keep rural land which is
to be ‘developed’.8 Whether they sell such land or keep it, the UUEM could be
expected to economically benefit from the effects of urbanization and the related
conversion of agricultural land into residential areas, as this land use change in
general increase both the value of the invested capital and the income that can be
made from it.
Another source of capital gains mentioned in the empirical material is when farm
real-estate is ‘freed up’ as a consequence of farm mergers. When what was
formerly two farms are made into one, the residential houses belonging to the
farm which ceases to exist as a separate unit are made redundant, and can as such
be sold off on the real estate market. This is income-generating in itself, but also
has the added benefit of decreasing the UUEM’s maintenance costs, since, as
7 A neighbourhood in southern Uppsala.
8 One such example is Malma gård, an UUEM farm with a sitting lessee in Valsätra in Uppsala,
where the UUEM has teamed up with a private company which will be constructing townhouses
on the farm property, given that the planning permission requested from the municipality is
obtained (Uppsala kommun, 2020).
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several informants pointed out, owning buildings carries relatively high financial
risk.9
6.1.3. Extracting Yield from the Land
The last identified dimension of the UUEM’s economic model is the investment
income in the form of land rents which is extracted from the farms.
As seen in section 4.3., the Swedish legislation states that the size of land rents
should reflect the income the farmer can be expected to make from working the
land. In relation to this, the UUEM has developed its own model for determining
the rental value of farms and farmland. According to informants, this model takes
different factors into account, including soil type, the type and quality of farm
infrastructure (such as buildings, drainage solutions, driers and/or other equipment,
etc.), as well as how the farm is ‘designed’. The informant “Kjell” chose to focus
on the latter in his description of the UUEM’s land valuation model:
“They decide [the land rent] based on how the farm looks (...) If you have
nice even fields, then [the land rent] shoots up right away because then
the land is easy to work.” - Kjell
6.1.4. Summary
To summarize, the economic model of the UUEM could be described as having
three dimensions. The first dimension relates to the larger context of the
institution’s financial portfolio. During the interview, the UUEM land manager
emphasized this motivation for keeping land as an asset, in line with the previous
research, which stresses the importance of ‘portfolio thinking’ for investors (see
Fairbairn, 2014a; Ouma, 2016).
The second dimension of the economic model is related to the invested capital
‘locked’ in the land, the value of which appreciates over time. The UUEM profits
from capital gains when assets are ‘freed up’ and taken out of agricultural
production. This occurs as a consequence of urbanization, given the ‘rent gap’
which exists between urban and agricultural land uses. It can also occur as farms
are merged and properties are divided, as residential houses sold as real estate on
the market without any attached farmland are attractive to a large variety of
potential buyers.
9 The UUEM manager also referred to the social benefits of making these sales, as retiring lessees
can get the chance to buy their rented homes on the market when the cropland they have worked is
added to another farm unit.
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The third and last dimension of the UUEM’s economic model is connected to the
productive capacity of the agricultural land and the surpluses the institutional
landowner extracts from the farms. Given the design of the UUEM’s land rent
valuation model, more surpluses are extracted per hectare from larger and better-
equipped farm units. This means that the two main ways for the UUEM to
increase its investment income is to enlarge units on the one hand, and to invest in
farm infrastructure on the other. Land consolidation and land investment, as the
two central ingredients of the UUEM’s land management strategy identified here,
will be the topic of the next section.
6.2. Land Management: Relationships and Practices
Having thus characterized the economic model of the UUEM, the focus will now
shift to the land management strategy of the institution. Land investments and
land consolidation, which have emerged inductively from the material as two
central aspects of the UUEM’s land management strategy, is used as a starting
point for this section, the first three subsections of which will deal with different
practices related to land consolidation, with the subsequent two parts having land
investments as their primary focus.
6.2.1. Scale Rationalization as Institutional Priority
As seen in the previous section, the UUEM benefits in multiple ways from
enlarging units, as farm enlargement is the basis for land rent increases while also
being a source of capital gains, given that the institution can sell off some
property on the real estate market when farms are merged.
Based on the collected material, increasing the size of farms seems to be a central
priority for the UUEM. During the interviewed UUEM land manager’s career, the
institution has consolidated units at a rapid rate, going from managing 169
individual farm units to having just 39, with both the number of units and their
average size notably having changed just in the last few years (cf. Uppsala Nya
Tidning, 2017). The UUEM manager states that this development is in line with
the general trend in Swedish agriculture:
“When I started [working for the UUEM], a large farm was a farm over a
hundred hectares and we were managing very few farms like that. (...) The
rationalization process continues and there are scale advantages which
fuels [this process] in agriculture. And it is not only our farms - the
agricultural sector in general is in a continuous re-structuration [process].
If you look at our farms today, the average size is around 300 hectares
and from that level there are still benefits to be had from further
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expansions. Then there is the question of at what point an economy of
scale becomes a dis-economy of scale. We do not really know that, there is
no good research on the topic, but we know for sure that there is such a
point. It should vary depending on how the farms are expanded: how far
one has to travel to the fields, how big the fields are, how rational they are
to work and so on.” - UUEM manager
As indicated in the theory chapter, the ‘rationality’ of units is in this context
decided in relation to labour-saving machinery, the investments in which can only
be recouped if farms supersede a certain size: “If you are going to have a
rational fleet of machines, you need around 400 hectares”, as one informant put it.
According to the manager, the UUEM is actively working to expand farms, with
the aim of consolidating all its land into fewer, but more profitable units of scale.
Some of the interviewed lessees claimed that scale rationalization was an
institutional priority of the UUEM to the point where farm mergers are
orchestrated by the landowner ‘from above’.
“When a farm is unoccupied then [UUEM say]: “Well, so-and-so, he gets
that land.” And then they give it to him, whether he wants to or not” - Leif
“I know of someone that they want to add more land to, but he doesn’t
want more land, because he thinks his neighbour should get to have it.
They trample on everybody.” - Kjell
The informants “Kjell” and “Leif” claim that the UUEM push lessees to receive
additional land in cases when these have had little personal interest in expanding
their operations. The ‘expert’ “Torsten” describes how he understands this
dynamic, based on his contact with UUEM lessees:
“If you are a producer and get told that you can take over a lease of a
hundred hectares, and you say that you are content with what you got,
[then they can tell you]: ”Yeah, but if you don’t take this, we will have a
hard time investing in you in the future.” - Torsten
The pressure exerted by UUEM on lessees to expand was confirmed in the
interview with the previous lessee “Göran”, who claimed to have chosen to
terminate his contract with the UUEM in response to the institution’s effort to
‘pile’ some additional hundreds of hectares of land on him. Such cases however
seem to be the exception rather than the rule, given that several interviewed
farmers claimed to have been the ones to contact the UUEM to let them know of
their interest in receiving additional land, and with several lessees also expanding
their operations by leasing additional land from private landowners.
The UUEM’s top-down approach to farm expansion was nonetheless a recurrent
topic in the collected material, with the institutional landowner clearly taking an
active part in the long-term strategic planning of units. The UUEM land manager
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claimed that the concentration of the institution’s land to some core areas in
Uppland and Västmanland is not only is a consequence of the consolidation of
land into larger units, but that it also has been motivated by the knowledge-
intensity of this long-term planning.
“In Uppland and Västmanland, we know what access we have to
craftsmen, for example, and what government agencies are administrating
different matters, what government officials are administering different
matters, what the municipalities’ planning looks like, which affects our
own planning, and then we can largely follow what’s happening in the
local press as well.” - UUEM manager
The UUEM land manager is here portraying the institution as actively working to
(re)configure the land.
In order to materialize its plans, the institution however does not only have to
allocate land to some producers, but also distribute it away from others. The next
two subsections will deal with how this can be done in practice.
6.2.2. Disrupted Farm Successions
Land has been consolidated at a rapid pace by the UUEM during the last decades,
as established in the previous subsection. Many farms seem to have been merged
in cases where no children have been interested in taking over the family farm
from the retiring generation. Several informants however also reported that the
UUEM at times has actively opposed the inter-generational transfers of tenancy
rights by denying producers to pass on the farm lease to their children.10
When asked about the possibility of passing on tenancy rights to the next
generation, the UUEM manager emphasized the fact that tenure contracts in
Sweden are inheritable as a general rule, unless the landlord disputes the
suitability of the new lessee or the financial viability of the farm unit:
“The law says that if the farm is financially viable, and there is a daughter
or son that wants to take over, and that person has sufficient prerequisites
to do so, then the transfer is more or less automatic (...).” - UUEM
manager
Given that these conditions are unquestionably met, the transfer of tenancy rights
is in other words largely guaranteed. The land manager also pointed out that those
whose requests to hand over the use rights to the agricultural land are denied can
appeal the landowner’s decision to a Tenancy Tribunal.
10 One informant also claimed to know of instances where the UUEM opposed the transfer of
tenancy rights between generations on a particular farm, only to offer the heirs in question access
to a different farm from the one they had grown up on.
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In emphasizing the right of tenants in this way, the land manager however failed
to mention that the Swedish legislation gives parties considerable freedom of
contract on this matter, i.e. the right to inherit agricultural lease contracts can be
further restricted by clauses added in the legal agreement between parties. The
UUEM’s right to dismiss requests from tenants who wish to pass on tenancy
rights within the family was clearly established in the institution’s agricultural
leases for the 2014-2019 period, where it is stated that:
“The lessee is allowed to transfer the right of tenancy to his/her spouse or
child, unless the leased property is to be used for rationalization purposes
or the UUEM has another legitimate reason to oppose the transfer of
rights.”
While several lessee and expert informants portrayed the institution to make use
of this legal room of maneuver in a more systematic way, the UUEM manager
claimed that the institution to his knowledge had only opposed the inter-
generational transfer of tenancy rights on one singular occasion.
6.2.3. Contract Termination
Aside from being able to prevent farm successions on its land, the UUEM can
also, if need be, directly try to terminate contracts. This does not least become
relevant for the institution when additional farmland is purchased to be
consolidated into existing units. According to Swedish legislation, sitting lessees
keep their tenancy rights even as land is sold or transferred to another owner. For
the UUEM, it is then convenient to be able to evict such ‘pre-existing’ tenants in
order to be able to consolidate land as planned.
Even so, the UUEM manager claimed that the institution is often willing to
‘bridge the gap’, and let these lessees keep working such purchased plots during
the years remaining until their retirement.
“We have a number of cases where we [have] let the tenure contracts
continue [to be renewed] for as long as the lessee is operating. And then
we have carried out the rationalization afterwards. It is not always
possible to do that, but it has been in many cases.“ - UUEM manager
In cases where it has not been ‘possible’ to let sitting lessees stay on the land, the
UUEM is able to terminate the tenure relation in one of two ways. The first is
connected to the indenture of one-year contracts which do not provide lessees
with tenure security. In most cases, the lessee in question then has to relinquish
their security of tenure by accepting to exchange their five-year for a one-year
contract. At least one example where a lessee had agreed to make this switch, not
fully anticipating the consequences of his actions, was brought up during the
interviews.
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In cases where tenants oppose such a contract swap, the UUEM can terminate
contracts by exploiting the legal loophole awarded in the Swedish legislation to
landowners who wish to ‘rationalize’ units. As seen in the background section,
tenancy contracts in Sweden can be discontinued if the landowner can ‘make
evident that the land is needed for a more efficient division of farm units (...)’
(Jordabalk, 1970:994). According to the UUEM land manager, the institution has
terminated leases in order to consolidate units on a number of occasions, but
agreements have supposedly been reached outside of court on all occasions but
one.
“In a few cases, we have also terminated [contracts] for rationalization
purposes but it hasn’t… We have only had one case in the Tenancy
Tribunal where we haven’t fully agreed with each other, but otherwise…
you sit down together and discuss to find solutions.” - UUEM manager
According to one informant, the UUEM is in general reluctant to take matters to
court. Backed by the legal framework in private negotiations, the institution, in his
words, prefers to remind lessees that there is legal precedent for contract
termination. The topic of lessee-landlord negotiations will be returned to in
section 6.2.5.
6.2.4. Farm Investment
As we have seen, the expansion of units is a priority for the UUEM. In seeking to
create economies of scale, the institution has reportedly been known to ‘deny
entry’ to farm youth interested in succeeding their parents, terminate lease
contracts and distribute land among its lessees in a top-down manner. Aside from
the expansion of units, the other identified strategy the UUEM uses to increase the
extracted investment income from its farmland is farm infrastructure investments,
which are used to warrant permanent land rent increases.
According to the UUEM land manger, these investments tend to have a certain
profile, as certain types of farm investment are more attractive for the institution
than others:
“In tenancy farming in general, it is more difficult to have niche farms.
They do not really work in the tenancy system (...) [Niche farms] can be
very profitable for one person who has certain skills and is dedicated to
the task, while being worthless for the 99,9 percent of farmers that are not
skilled in that type of production. And that is why… We invest a lot in
facilities to develop the farms together with the lessees, but we make
investments that are generic, that anyone could step in and use and benefit
from.” - UUEM manager
As the institution’s farms are supposed to ‘out-live’ the producers working them,
the UUEM’s investments into the means of production is, according to the
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interviewed land manager, not compatible with what he refers to as ‘niche’
production. This implies that there are limitations to what farm specializations
lessees can reasonably pursue on a UUEM farm. Given the emphasis placed by
the UUEM on the substitution of labour by capital through the creation of
economies of scale, the design of the institution’s farm units would seemingly
favour large-scale capital-intensive production, and thereby also a certain type of
rural landscape. This is also evident in the type of farm investment which the
UUEM manager claims that the institution prioritizes, namely grain storage
facilities that enable producers to sit on their harvest and time sales in relation to
market fluctuations:
“We are actively pushing for it, and have been for a long time (...) At the
moment we are upgrading and investing in three grain storage units, last
year it was two, and the year before that we also had a couple, so this is
something we put a lot of energy and capital into.” - UUEM manager
Lessees however made no mentions of feeling pressured to agree to investments
during interviews, nor did any of them claim to feel limited when choosing what
crops to produce or how. According to the UUEM manager, the institution
believes that non-interference as a general principle is most conducive to its
interests.
“The best results come from doing what you are good at. And it is
fundamentally so that if farms are well-functioning and lessees have good
profit margins (...) then there is a bit of room left to pay a land rent.” -
UUEM manager
The UUEM is as such, according to the land manager, indifferent to if lessees
produce grain or meat; use conventional or ecological methods; employ hired or
family labour, as well as if agricultural production is done in combination to other
on-farm income generating activities or not. Farmers are in short left to choose
how to manage the leased farms however they wish, as long as they purse a type
of farm development path compatible with the type of farm unit the UUEM
creates.
Would the UUEM feel the need to intervene in farmers’ production strategies
more directly, their legal right to do so is however also stipulated in the lease
contract studied as a part of the empirical material for this thesis. There it is stated
that: “The orientation and mode of farm operations should be decided in
consultation with the UUEM”.
6.2.5. Negotiation, Co-operation and Lessee Investments
As we have seen, farm investment and land consolidation are key to the land
management strategy of the UUEM, as they warrant land rent increases. These
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measures are also at least in theory meant to increase the profitability of
agricultural operations to a similar extent, given that land rents according to
Swedish legislation should reflect the yielding capacity of the land. Many
informants however considered it a truth self-evident that lessee and landowner
have fundamental underlying differences of interests, and that this can make
landowner’s surplus extraction diverge from the actual profit levels of lessees.
The lessees’ ability to negotiate land rents was in this context described by several
informants as being quite limited.
“You can’t afford to lose the land, and then you can agree to land
rent increases or terms and conditions that don’t benefit you.” -
Mats
Tenants depend on the consolidated UUEM farm units for both livelihood and
residence,11 an economic dependence which puts them at a disadvantage in
negotiations, according to “Mats”. The interviewed ‘expert’ “Kristian” argued that
there is a general problem in Sweden of land rents increasing relative to
agricultural incomes. According to “Kristian”, one reason for this is that
landowners can use the power to rationalize units as a leverage when negotiating
land rents:
“It’s not an easy task for a lessee to present a profitability
calculation and claim that: “It just isn’t possible. I’m not agreeing
to a land rent increase”, and then you end up in a dispute, and then
you can end up in a situation where [the landowner] says that: “In
that case, this unit is too small. Then it is better suited in another
configuration where it can carry greater costs.” - Kristian
Several interviewed lessees claimed that the UUEM can be a tough negotiator,
with some alleging that the UUEM makes use of language and tactics perceived
as intimidating or even threatening. The UUEM however seemed to wish to avoid
negotiations with lessees whenever possible, working instead to create routines
and standardized practices, e.g. in relation to land rent valuation and the division
of farm maintenance costs. According to the UUEM manager, such measures are
put it place partly to ensure the long-term social sustainability of the institution.
“We won’t be able to keep at it for another four hundred years if we
get into a situation where we are constantly negotiating and are
wary of each other and where there are mutual feelings of mistrust.”
- UUEM manager
On several occasions during the interviews, the UUEM land manager emphasized
that the institution and its lessees has a common interest in developing the farms,
11 That the leased farm should also function as homestead is an institutional preference, which was
expressed in the 2014-2019 lease contracts and which several informants also reported that UUEM
employees had communicated to them verbally.
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as well as the importance of good cooperation between landowner and agricultural
tenants to achieve this mutual goal of increasing the farms’ profitability.
“The cooperation that we have with our farm unit tenants, the
dedication that necessarily arises from both our end and the lessees’
end - it makes for good development and benefits both parties a lot.”
- UUEM manager
In contrast to interviewed lessees, the land manager notably did not portray the
power relations between landowner and tenant as being asymmetrical, instead
characterizing the relationship between the institution and its tenants as that of
‘equal partners’, referring to lessees as ‘professional entrepreneurs’, some of
which whose families the institution had started ‘co-operating’ with as early as
the 1680s.
While interviewing lessees, it became clear that these also invested in their leased
farms, but to quite varying extents. One interviewed lessee said he had made a
number of larger farm investments of his own, e.g. adding buildings to the farm,
after reaching an agreement with the UUEM in which the institution assented to
purchase these off him when he retires. By using his own labour and capital
borrowed elsewhere, the lessee in question claimed to have saved money by
strategically choosing to not have the UUEM finance these investments.
In the case of another informant, investing in the leased farm seemed to not only
be about saving money:
“Some farmers can be very spoiled, I think. As soon as they want
something they call the UUEM and say that: ‘Here there is a need
for maintenance work, and here this, and here that’. And there are
others like me that are of the opinion that if you own a farm, then
you should be shouldering your own costs.” - Mats
“Mats” self-image as an autonomous farmer seemed to impact his decision-
making as a lessee, possibly to the point where he shoulders more farm-related
costs than his tenant colleagues. Others were less willing to carry these costs. On
the extreme end of the spectrum was a lessee who expressed dissatisfaction with
the institutional landowner, and stated that he used less and inferior inputs on
UUEM land in a strategic bid to extract short-term profits from the rented land.
6.2.6. Summary
Land investment in farm infrastructure and farm expansion are two interventions
which, given the design of the UUEM’s land valuation model, warrant land rent
increases. As such, they are ways for the institution to increase the income
investment made from the farmland. The UUEM is openly seeking to create large-
scale units by actively planning for and orchestrating the consolidation of units
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‘from above’. The institution also invest in their farms in a way, which according
to the UUEM land manager, is not compatible with all types and degrees of farm
specialization. As I will return to in the discussion, the UUEM can as such be said
to steer the agricultural production undertaken on its land into a certain matrix,
even as lessees seem to have considerable room for maneuver within the frames
set up by the institution.
6.3. Farmer Perspectives
In this last section of the empirical part of this thesis, the focus will lie on
lessees‘ perspectives on the institutional landowner and agrarian change. In the
first three subsections, excerpts from interviews with three individual lessees will
be used to illustrate how current changes in the agricultural sector is viewed
largely through a depoliticized frame. In the last subsection, the criticism
expressed by some lessees against the UUEM will be summarized.
6.3.1. Scale Rationalization as Modernization
Many of the interviewed farmers seemed to see the UUEM as an actor taking
responsibility for and putting in the work to keep agricultural units profitable in
the Swedish cost-price squeezed context. The lessee “Mats” portrays the UUEM
as an actor propelling the structural transformation of agriculture on a local level.
“As a principle, I think it’s good to have an active landowner that is
trying to amass acreages. They are keen to put together financially
viable units. I don’t think there’s anything weird about that.” -
Mats
“If we are going to have a good, modern agricultural sector in
Sweden, then it’s good if there are those that can take it upon
themselves to do some re-structuration. I think it’s good that they
are active landowners. But of course there are always going to be
some who get affected negatively.” - Mats
Scale rationalization and the increased consolidation of land, although an
exclusionary type of agricultural development, seems to be seen by “Mats” as the
only available path, if Swedish agriculture is to be ‘modern’ and in step with the
requirements of the times.
The need for actors such as the UUEM to drive the process of scale rationalization
is indirectly portrayed as steaming from the fact that few family farmers can
afford to pursue this type of capital-intensive farm development path,with “Mats”
being one of several informants who spoke of how rapid land appreciation is
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increasing the gap between those who can afford to invest in land and those who
can not:
“In our area, we have a couple of very well-capitalized private
landowners that fight over the few farms that are put up for sale. If
you have to borrow money to finance [a land purchase], then you
have no chance of keeping up. So that is... It doesn’t have to be
institutions that push up the prices.” - Mats
“And they have money coming from outside (...) They have money
coming in from other businesses that they think it’s nice to invest in
land.” - Mats
“Mats” describes how two private landowners and producers in his area is buying
land with capital they have accumulated from other sectors. The long-term
investment horizon of these buyers make those who are dependent on agriculture
for their main or only source of income unable to compete.
For “Mats” and several other interviewed lessees, growing land inequality and the
increasing financialization of land as such seem to be clearly visible but
depoliticized trends. In the words of another interviewed lessee, the expansion of
units, and the ‘disappearance’ of family farming, is after all ‘a natural
development’.
6.3.2. ‘Getting a Lot for Your Money’: Financialization as
Opportunity
Another lessee lacking the capital to compete on the land market in Uppland is
“Kjell”, who however still saw possibilities for producers such as himself to
benefit from the financialization of land. The following interview snippet begins
with “Kjell” talking about a discussion he had had with a colleague:
“And I told him:“sell [your land] to the UUEM instead and you’ll
improve your situation. And then you can live a bit and have some
fun for that money instead.” (...) I guess [the farm] has been passed
down and that is why they don’t want to sell. If [a farm] has been
passed down for generations, selling it is a bit sensitive. [If I owned
a farm] I would have sold it right away (...) Then I could use [the
money] to improve my fleet of machines and stuff like that and not
have to borrow [money]. Maybe you can invest in something else.
You can buy forest up in Norrland (...) seeing that [land] is cheap
[there]. You get a lot for your money. (...) You would have somebody
managing [the forest] for you [if so], or get a forest company to
do the planting and harvesting. You wouldn’t do it yourself. But it’s
not relevant for me at this point. If I had been younger, I would have
done it. (...) They have always said that it pays off to buy forest.”
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- Kjell
In the beginning of this excerpt, “Kjell” is speaking of a family he knows. The
family members’ emotional attachment to the family farm is portrayed by “Kjell”
almost as an obstacle to making the financially sound decision of freeing up the
capital that is locked in the land by selling the farm. According to “Kjell”, smaller
financial players such as themselves benefit from the financialization of land by
selling land in Uppland, where farmland is expensive, and investing it in land
where it is cheaper, such as in the forested Swedish North.
Ultimately, the increasing separation between ownership and production is framed
by “Kjell” not just as an opportunity for farmers to become land investors
themselves, but also to remain in the agricultural sector as producers:
“Someone bought a farm for 160 million Swedish crowns?12 Maybe
there is a lessee there, maybe he is allowed to stay. He can’t afford
to buy [the property], but he can (...) continue to lease [it].” - Kjell
Land investments are here seen to provide farmers with the opportunity to remain
in agriculture, at a time when the increased capital requirements makes it
unfeasible for farmers to own the land they work.
6.3.3. ‘Like a Job’: Sectoral Identity and Inter-generational
Shifts
Several of the interviewed lessee came from families where tenancy rights to the
UUEM farm had been passed down for generations. One such lessee is “Oskar”,
who however thought it natural if his family’s use right to the farm in question
would end with him:
“If I had a son or a daughter who was super interested in taking
over this lease, then maybe that would be possible, I don’t know, but
it’s not something you can take for granted - absolutely not! I’m the
lessee now and it has to work out: the children in that case would
need to have the economy and the knowledge to take over this lease.
This is like a job, you know. Maybe not like any old job, but... There
are few occupations where you can come and say that: “Well, my
father worked as a doctor here, so now I want to be a doctor too,”
or something like that. That’s not how it works.” - Oskar
According to “Oskar”, tenancy rights are awarded to individual agricultural
professionals based on merit and economic situation, not on familial ties. This
individualistic mindset stands in stark contrast to the fact that all interviewed
lessees inherited their occupational identity, and in most cases also ownership or
access to land, from the previous generation.
12 On the 8th of June in 2021, onehundredsixty million Swedish crowns equaled around 19.35 million US
dollars.
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6.3.4. The Re-politicization of Land
Not all informants shared the views expressed by “Mats”, “Kjell”, and “Oskar”
however. By contrast, a few informants denounced the concentration of UUEM
land, claiming that the institution made it more difficult for private individuals to
access land by outbidding private farmers and contributing to land price increases.
It was also claimed that the different conditions under which legal and physical
persons compete constitutes a form of unfair market competition:
“A regular farmer has to pay for land with money from a taxed
income. (...) If a company buys [land], they have a lower company
tax, if they have to pay for the purchase with taxed money at all. And
a trust doesn’t have to pay any taxes.” - Roland
The UUEM manager and a couple of lessees countered this criticism by stating
that the UUEM at times also puts losing bids at land auctions. For all the (untaxed)
capital it manages, the UUEM’s land investments still need to live up to the
profitability requirements decided by the institution’s board, which means that the
UUEM cannot always keep up with what its competitors are willing to pay.
The critique against the UUEM was rarely only about wanting to ensure fair
competition on a free market, however. Most often it also had an ideological edge,
with some informants expressing a clear preference for an agrarian structure
characterized by privately-owned, more moderately-sized farms. This ‘alternative’
view is maybe best represented by the informant “Leif” who referenced non-
financial values, such as wanting to see a thriving countryside, when criticizing
the effects of UUEM in his local area.
“My opinion is that the countryside becomes devalued when there
is one big, strong actor with a lot of money. (...) The units become
too large and it affects the area a lot, making it very sterile.” - Leif
“I have friends in Västerås and I have friends outside of Enköping,
around Örsundsbro and in those areas, and spread out all over the
place. And they purchase land, and they exchange, and they lease,
and one quits, and the other one gets that land, and it goes around
and circulates. And here it is just clogged, there is nothing. And I
think life becomes miserable then. I want to see a thriving
countryside. I want to see a new lessee, a new producer on this
farm” - Leif
“Leif” was one of few informants who clearly expressed dissatisfaction with
current agrarian development trends. For “Leif”, land issues are political, and he
lamented that they, according to him, are not treated as such:
“The sad part is when you talk to the politicians, then they don’t…
the politicians in this town don’t know... (...) And they are not
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interested at all. I have gone to the politicians’ campaign stalls
when there have been elections to talk about this matter. But no,
nobody has cared. (...) I think it’s a shame that the politicians
haven’t seen the consequences of [the market deregulation]. Before
the deregulation, the UUEM wasn’t allowed to purchase land. (...)
Then when [the Agricultural Committees] were shut down, the
UUEM took on their role. We went from one management to
another.” - Leif
“Leif” draws the connection between the deregulation of the land market and the
increasing dominance of the UUEM in his local area. “ Leif” portrays the UUEM
as having almost monopolistic power over the land market around his community,
and interprets this to be a consequence of a receding state, with the power over the
land market having gone from one institution to another. Later during the
interview, “Leif” questioned why the UUEM’s land management strategy had to
be based around the ownership of complete farm units, proposing instead an
alternative model wherein the institution’s land ownership would consist solely of
geographically-dispersed plots of land leased out to different family farmers as a
complement to their privately-owned land.
While “Leif” questioned who should own land, another interviewed lessee
questioned how agrarian surpluses should be allocated, criticizing the idea that
surpluses should be flowing from rural to urban areas, and that agriculture should
be a source of capital for the university.
“Maybe it is not really sustainable today, that the agricultural
sector should be providing for the university.” - Nils
6.3.5. Summary
This section has been focused on how lessees view the UUEM and the
financialization of land. “Mats”, “Oskar”, and “Kjell” here represents a group for
which expansion rather than continuation is considered the norm, and agrarian
change is portrayed largely as an unpolitical, economic process, in which external
actors can provide opportunities for farmers who need to adapt to the increasing
capital intensity of agriculture. In contrast, there were a few informants who
expressed an alternative view, questioning the desirability of this type of
agricultural development, and expressing a preference for family farmers’ land
ownership.
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In this chapter, I will discuss the research findings in relation to the aim of this
thesis. I will start by discussing the UUEM’s economic model, and how it relates
to family farming, as the production unit underpinning the agrarian structure in
Sweden. In subsection 7.2. I will discuss some implications of the interviewed
farmers’ perspectives on the UUEM and interrelated agrarian developments. In
the last subsection, I will return to the two identified main aspects of the UUEM’s
land management strategy, namely scale rationalization and farm infrastructure
investments. in order to answer the second research question on how the UUEM
impacts the agricultural production carried out on its land.
7.1. The Family Farm as an Asset
As we have seen, the UUEM is continuously collecting investment income in the
form of land rents, while also consistently profiting from capital gains. The
UUEM can summarily be described as having a long-term investment horizon,
and to be pursuing a low risk, largely production-oriented land management
strategy (cf. Fairbairn, 2014b). That the UUEM’s land ownership is motivated to a
large extent by the benefits that asset diversification brings to the larger financial
portfolio of the institution was confirmed by the UUEM land manager, who
emphasized the advantages of complimenting high-risk investments with ones that,
like land, yield stable but relatively modest income streams. This is in line with
previous research (e.g. Ouma, 2016). The one aspect of the institution’s economic
model that could be said to be disconnected from agricultural productivity is the
capital gains made from the dramatic appreciation of land in the vicinity of urban
areas. The qualitative data collected for this thesis however do not allow me to
assess the size of these capital gains, or if they in any way influence what land the
UUEM chose to purchase.
Based on the theoretical framework, the UUEM can be expected to benefit in
multiple ways from relying on tenancy and family farms, rather than directly
manage the land themselves. Firstly, family farmers carry the risks that come with
agricultural production, which ranges from weather-related yield losses to
changes in input or output prices (Goodman & Radcliff, 1985; Singer, Green &
7. Discussion
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Gilles, 2008). Since land rents are decoupled from such risks they are also
effectively disconnected from ‘real’ farm profitability. Producers are in other
words carrying the costs of agricultural production, while the UUEM reaps much
of the rewards, appropriating both production surpluses and obtaining the gains
made from asset appreciation. Secondly, family farmers typically engage in self-
exploitation e.g. by not remunerating their labour in accordance with its market
value (van der Ploeg, 2008). Leasing out land to family farmers is as such a way
to extract surpluses from agriculture without having to pay for labour at market
rates, nor having to bear the considerable risks associated with agricultural
production. The strands of thinking drawn upon in the theory chapter can
therefore be said to be applicable on the investigated case, with a particularly
good example of how external actors can benefit from (self-exploitative) family
farming being the producer mentioned in section 6.2.5. who made his own
investments to the leased farm, which are to be ‘bought out’ by the UUEM when
the lessee in question retires. Using his own labour and machines at below market
rates, and borrowing low-interest capital elsewhere, the farmer could
‘outcompete’ the terms of investment offered by the UUEM. While the farmer
could save money and decrease his production costs in this way, the agreement is
far from a bad deal for the landowner, as the UUEM will increase the value of its
farm property by buying additional infrastructure that it has not had to pay to
administer.
That the theoretical framework can be used to explain this dynamic between the
landowner and the producers indicates that it continues to be meaningful to speak
of family farming in the studied context. At the same time, the conditions under
which farmers are operating is obviously changing, as the scale of agricultural
production has increased, and farmers have come to manage higher fixed costs
and financial risk. The example of the farmer mentioned above could possibly be
said to demonstrate a way producers can adapt to these changing conditions - with
an increasing amount of external financial actors in agriculture, the financially-
savvy farmers’ ability to ‘play the field’ to achieve their own strategic goals can
maybe also increase. Likewise, it is easy to see why both landowner and lessees
showed interest in investing in grain storage units that increase producers’ ability
to choose when to sell their harvests, hence strengthening their bargaining
position in relation to downstream actors. While the cost-price squeeze has
increased the external pressures on farmers, there are as such also possible signs
that the increasing capital-intensity of agriculture does not only limit family
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farmers’13 room for maneuver, but that the family farm’s increasing
‘enmeshment’ in capital relations also can create new possible avenues of action.
7.2. The Financialized Farmer
During the interviews, several lessees notably spoke of agrarian change in largely
depoliticized terms. Rapid land appreciation, land inequality, and the subsequent
growing separation between labour and ownership over the means of production
were in general not depicted as problems when referenced. The financialization of
land and corporate entities’ land ownership in many case seemed to be seen as
providing farmers with the opportunity to stay in agriculture, be it as renters rather
than owners.14 .
Many lessees as such seemed to be embracing the norm of farm expansion over
farm continuation.15 One example of this change in norms is the lessee “Oskar”,
who considered it to be obvious that tenants’ access to land should not be
inheritable but based on individual merit, a surprising view considering his
family’s history on the farm he lives and works. By making this argument,
“Oskar” is in a sense normalizing the UUEM’s power to disrupt farm succession
by ‘denying entry’ to farm heirs. The fact that farmers are not passive recipients
of financialization - but are actively adapting to, and even co-creating this process
- is otherwise especially evident in the case of the lessee “Kjell”, who notably
spoke of the opportunity for producers to become land investors themselves.
That the increased supply and demand for financial capital in agriculture is
connected to an increasing financialization of farmers’ conceptions of self is
indicated by previous research (Silvasti, 2009), with this internalization of
financial values, and penetration of financial logics into everyday life being seen
13 For all the talk of ‘family farming’, I want to emphasize again that the role(s) and voice(s) of
female family members are made invisible throughout this thesis, which in itself maybe hints at
potential gendered aspects of the topic at hand. This is a subject which I think merits being
properly investigated in the future.
14 This is in line with previous research, see e.g. Sippel, Larder & Lawrence, 2017; Ouma, 2016.
15 The farmers interviewed for this study are however unlikely to represent the whole range of
farmer identities and logics in Sweden, seeing as all lessees, to overgeneralize a bit, follow a
similar farm development path of intensified production, in a region where this is largely the norm.
All interviewed farmers, whether they expressed a more ‘critical’ or a more ‘depoliticized’ view of
the UUEM, could after all be said to be invested in the ‘production treadmill’. By comparison, the
Swedish small-holder organization referenced the concept of food sovereignty when criticizing the
proposal to deregulate the Swedish land market through the elimination of the current Land
Acquisition Act (Slätmo, 2018). This type of comparatively radical discourse was not represented
in the material collected for this thesis, but might be circulating among farmers on more marginal
land, whose viewpoints obviously are not being represented here.
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as forming part of the financialization phenomenon by some scholars (Clapp &
Isakson, 2018).
Having lessees that relate to land primarily as an economic resource might not
always be in the interest of financial investors however, as indicate by the
example of the lessee who was consciously trying to make short-term profits
from the leased land by under-investing in it. In light of this example, it seems to
be in the interest of the UUEM to make sure that a core group of farmers that are
not to be ‘rationalized away with’ feel that they have secure long-term access to
land16 that they are willing to invest in. Even as it works to consolidate units, the
UUEM in other words also benefits from having lessees who have a personal
investment in the farm, as the low monitoring costs of the family farming model is
based on the alignment of owner and labour interest in the long-term management
of land. This could be interpreted to provide the type of land investor investigate
here with some incentive to care for the social impacts of its practices. That the
UUEM is an ‘atypical’ and geographically-centered land investor matters in this
context, as lessees, due to their geographical proximity, seemed to know each
other and have the opportunity to discuss perceived injustices or malpractices
among themselves. This relative ‘transparency’ should contribute to the
landowner’s incentive to limit the use of coercive practices, as its treatment of one
lessee potentially can impact its relationship with others.
7.3. Rationalizations, Farm Designs and External
Management
Based on the empirical material collected for this thesis, I think it can be argued
that the UUEM to some extent shapes the type of agriculture practiced on the land
that it owns.
The institution does this first off by actively consolidating units. The results of
this thesis indicate that the UUEM is not trying to just expand the size of farms
when enlarging units, but that the expansion of farms is also motivated by the
pursuit of scale advantages. This is reflected in the institution’s land rent valuation
model, which is designed based on the assumption that farm scale and farm size
are to increase in tandem, given that it stipulates that higher land rents are to be
extracted per hectare from larger units. In short, larger units with more even fields
are expected to to be worked with greater labour productivity, which, as indicated
in the theory chapter, does not hold true in all cases or for all types of agricultural
16 The correlation between security of tenure and quality of soil management is supported by
previous research, see e.g. Fraser, 2004.
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production. By designing their rent valuation model in this way, the UUEM is
creating additional economic incentives for its lessees to pursue a scale expansion
farm development path.
When looking at the effects of the UUEM as a landowner, it is however important
to not exaggerate the uniqueness of its aims or its methods for achieving them.
While the scale rationalization strategy pursued by the UUEM could be said to
rely on the concentration of land and gradual expulsion of labour, it would be
misleading to not also mention that such changes can be described as long-
standing development trends in the Swedish plains. As seen in the theory chapter,
scale rationalization has long been a dominant solution to the cost-price squeeze
in Sweden and the Global North in general, even if it as a model for agricultural
development is also increasingly being questioned for its environmental
consequences (see Woodhouse, 2010). The perceived desirability of scale
rationalization in Swedish agriculture is not least reflected in the legislation,
where there e.g. is a loophole for scale rationalization which landowners can
exploit to terminate tenancy contracts. The proposal to eliminate the current Land
Acquisition Act is of course also built on the premise that it is desirable that
agriculture become more capital intensive.17
While there is a general trend towards more large-scale units in Sweden, the
empirical material indicates that on a local level, land consolidation is perceived
as being driven by just a few actors, whether these are expanding family-based
companies or institutional landowners. In this context, it is interesting that several
informants likened the UUEM with the Agricultural Committees (lantbruksnämnd)
active in Sweden during a large part of the 20th century, based on the fact that the
UUEM, similar to the Agricultural Committees of the previous era, is felt to have
the power to orchestrate farm, and by extension agrarian, development ‘from
above’. As such, the UUEM seems to be viewed as an actor that is propelling the
development towards more large-scale industrial agriculture locally, and that is
actively (co-)creating a certain type of rural landscape.
Of the two identified pillars of the UUEM’s land management strategy, the
process of land consolidation notably emerged as being built more on ‘non-
consensual’ top-down management and as being a point of contention in a way
which the institutions’ land investments were not. As we have seen, the UUEM
does not consolidate units by just purchasing land, but also by at times denying
tenancy rights to be passed on within families, terminating tenancy contracts, and
re-distributing land in a top-down manner. The institution can as such be seen to
17 From a more critical perspective, this can be seen as expressions of how large-scale industrial
agriculture is currently being politically favoured over other forms of agriculture (see Gowdy &
Beveye, 2019; van der Ploeg, 2010).
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control the allocation of land and the future reproduction of its farms.
Interestingly, the ‘atypical’ geographical proximity of the UUEM and its land
investments seem to make this land management strategy possible, as the socially
embedded nature of land means that the top-down planning of units require a
substantial amounts of local knowledge.
The UUEM also influences the agricultural production undertaken on its land
through its farm infrastructure investments. Notably, the institution’s farms were
reported by the interviewed UUEM manager to not be compatible with ‘niche’
production. ‘Niche’ production, whatever that refers to in this particular context,
is most probably always economically difficult on the plains in Uppland for
farmers who do not own their own land, given the pressure exerted on producers
by the high land prices. The main finding here is that the external landowner can
contribute and add obstacles for farmers who wish to pursue certain farm
specializations, thereby (further) restricting the farm development paths which
can reasonably be pursued by lessees. As already established, this seems to
however still leave considerable room of maneuver for farmers who can operate
relatively freely within the frames, which are set both by the larger economic
context and by the UUEM.
By seeking to create ‘standardized’ large-scale farms, the UUEM can be said to
actively be striving to minimize the role of labour in the production process, and
to favour an ‘industrial’ mode of production. Agricultural investments always
have a lock-in effect, and seeing as the landowner in this context has the ultimate
control over farm investments, the UUEM effectively has the power to steer
production into a certain matrix. The UUEM can as such be considered to be
functioning as a type of ‘external management’ (van der Ploeg, 2020) taking
strategic-level decisions on the farms. By extension, the institution can also be
said to be betting’ on a specific future of food production.
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In this thesis, I have looked at the case of the Uppsala University Endowment
Management (UUEM), an institution that owns farmland as a financial asset.
While the profits extracted from the land in the form of production surpluses and
capital gains seem to be modest, land was found to be desirable given the stability
it provides to the land investor’s total financial portfolio.
The UUEM was found to exert management influence over its farms, using its
geographical proximity and local knowledge to expand units in a top-down
manner, as well as exerting power through the control over farm investment and
infrastructure. By designing farms for large-scale capital-intensive production, the
UUEM could be said to steer the agricultural production undertaken on its land,
and to some degree limit the farm development paths which can reasonably be
pursued by lessees, even as these were found to also maintain considerable
autonomy in deciding what is to be produced and how.
The results of this study also indicate that the UUEM also have considerable
influence over farm reproduction,with the institution reportedly consolidating land
by e.g. denying farm heirs the right to succession, and by putting pressure on
other lessees to expand their operations. The long-term production-orientation of
the UUEM’s land management strategy, and the reliance on family farmers to
carry production risks and production costs, could however possibly provide
incentive to limit the use of these practices, as the low monitoring costs of the
UUEM’s land management strategy rests on the assumption that lessees are
personally invested in the land.
Interviewed lessees were found to have differing views on the UUEM. Many were
positive to the external landowner, which they saw as providing them with the
opportunity to keep up with the increasing capital requirements of agricultural
production in a region dominated by large-scale and intensive farming. Farmers
were in general not passive in relation to agrarian change, but seemed to be
actively adapting to and co-creating it.
8. Conclusion
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Lessees critical of the UUEM considered land issues to be political, and expressed
a preference for a land ownership structure dominated by private family farmers.
8.1. Final Reflections
The policy proposal to eliminate the current Land Acquisition Act is motivated by
the very assumption that opening up the land market to this type of landowner is
going to speed up the process of scale rationalization in Sweden. In this thesis, I
have shown an example of how what this process can look like in practice. The
extent of the ‘real’ quantitative impact of actors such as the UUEM on factors
such as land prices, average farm size, etc. locally lies outside the scope of this
thesis, but is potentially an interesting topic for future research.
Given that I have an epistemic relativistic worldview, I lastly want to underline
that the results of this study can be framed in various ways. While the UUEM’s
external land ownership can be seen to be associated with a loss of autonomy for
the family farm on the one hand, one could also argue that the institution, by
supporting a core group of farmers e.g. through land re-distribution, is taking
responsibility for securing the long-term financial viability of its farms, thereby
taking some pressure off its lessees, who do not have to be solely responsible for
securing the land and capital necessary for pursuing this type of cost-price
squeeze adaptation strategy. It is clear that many lessees benefits from the tenancy
relation, in as much as it allows them to continue on a capital intensive farm
development path which they might not otherwise have been able to pursue. As
such, external landowners of course really can provide opportunities for farmers
which allow them to successfully cope with the demands related to the increased
capital intensity of agriculture.
If the Swedish land market should be deregulated and the current Land
Acquisition Act removed or reworked is however a question which merits
political debate, as the financialization of land seems to contribute to the spread
of a production system associated with large externalized experimental costs, land
concentration, and loss of agricultural employment, while also potentially
contributing to the further widening of the gap between land prices and the profits
which can be made from agricultural production.
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